Overview
The overall goal of an emissions trading plan is to reduce
emissions. The cap is usually lowered over time - aiming towards
a national emissions reduction target.[4]
In other systems a portion of all traded credits must be
retired, causing a net reduction in emissions each time a trade
occurs. In many cap and trade systems, organizations which do
not pollute may also participate, thus environmental groups can
purchase and retire allowances or credits and hence drive up the
price of the remainder according to the
law of demand.[5]
Corporations can also prematurely retire allowances by donating
them to a nonprofit entity and then be eligible for a tax
deduction.
Because emissions trading uses markets to determine how to
deal with the problem of pollution, it is often touted as an
example of effective
free market environmentalism. While the cap is usually set
by a political process, individual companies are free to choose
how or if they will reduce their emissions. In theory, firms
will choose the least-costly way to comply with the pollution
regulation, creating incentives that reduce the cost of
achieving a pollution reduction goal.
History
The efficacy of what later was to be called the "cap and
trade" approach to air pollution abatement was first
demonstrated in a series of micro-economic computer simulation
studies between 1967 and 1970 for the National Air Pollution
Control Administration (predecessor to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Air and Radiation)
by Ellison Burton and William Sanjour. These studies used
mathematical models of several cities and their emission sources
in order to compare the cost and effectiveness of various
control strategies.[6][7][8][9][10]
Each abatement strategy was compared with the "least cost
solution" produced by a computer optimization program to
identify the least costly combination of source reductions in
order to achieve a given abatement goal.[11]
In each case it was found that the least cost solution was
dramatically less costly than the same amount of pollution
reduction produced by any conventional abatement strategy.[12]
This led to the concept of "cap and trade" as a means of
achieving the "least cost solution" for a given level of
abatement.
The development of emissions trading over the course of its
history can be divided into four phases:[13]
- Gestation: Theoretical articulation of the instrument
(by
Coase[14],
Crocker[15],
Dales[16],
Montgomery[17]
etc.) and, independent of the former, tinkering with
"flexible regulation" at the US Environmental Protection
Agency.
- Proof of Principle: First developments towards trading
of emission certificates based on the "offset-mechanism"
taken up in Clean Air Act in 1977.
- Prototype: Launching of a first "cap and trade" system
as part of the US
Acid Rain Program, officially announced as a paradigm
shift in environmental policy, as prepared by "Project 88",
a network-building effort to bring together environmental
and industrial interests in the US.
- Regime formation: branching out from the US clean air
policy to global climate policy, and from there to the
European Union, along with the expectation of an emerging
global carbon market and the formation of the "carbon
industry".
Cap and trade versus baseline and
credit
The textbook emissions trading program can be called a "cap
and trade" approach in which an aggregate cap on all sources is
established and these sources are then allowed to trade amongst
themselves to determine which sources actually emit the total
pollution load. An alternative approach with important
differences is a baseline and credit program.[18]
In a baseline and credit program a set of polluters that are not
under an aggregate cap can create credits by reducing their
emissions below a baseline level of emissions. These credits can
be purchased by polluters that do have a regulatory limit. Many
of the criticisms of trading in general are targeted at baseline
and credit programs rather than cap type programs.
The economics of international
emissions trading
It is possible for a country to reduce emissions using a
Command-Control approach, such as regulation, direct and
indirect taxes. The cost of that approach differs between
countries because the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) — the
cost of eliminating an additional unit of pollution — differs by
country. It might cost China $2 to eliminate a ton of
CO2, but it would probably cost Sweden or the
U.S. much more. International emissions-trading markets were
created precisely to exploit differing MACs.
Example
Emissions trading through 'Gains from Trade' can be more
beneficial for both the buyer and the seller than a simple
emissions capping scheme.
Consider two European countries, such as Germany and Sweden.
Each can either reduce all the required amount of emissions by
itself or it can choose to buy or sell in the market.
Example MACs for two different countries
For this example let us assume that Germany can abate its CO2
at a much cheaper cost than Sweden, e.g. MACS > MACG
where the MAC curve of Sweden is steeper (higher slope) than
that of Germany, and RReq is the total amount of
emissions that need to be reduced by a country.
On the left side of the graph is the MAC curve for Germany. RReq
is the amount of required reductions for Germany, but at RReq
the MACG curve has not intersected the market
allowance price of CO2 (market allowance price = P =
λ). Thus, given the market price of CO2 allowances,
Germany has potential to profit if it abates more emissions than
required.
On the right side is the MAC curve for Sweden. RReq
is the amount of required reductions for Sweden, but the MACS
curve already intersects the market price of CO2
allowances before RReq has been reached. Thus, given
the market allowance price of CO2, Sweden has
potential to make a cost saving if it abates fewer emissions
than required internally, and instead abates them elsewhere.
In this example Sweden would abate emissions until its MACS
intersects with P (at R*), but this would only reduce a fraction
of Sweden’s total required abatement. After that it could buy
emissions credits from Germany for the price 'P' (per unit). The
internal cost of Sweden’s own abatement, combined with the
credits it buys in the market from Germany, adds up to the total
required reductions (RReq) for Sweden. Thus Sweden
can make a saving from buying credits in the market (Δ d-e-f).
This represents the ‘Gains from Trade’, the amount of additional
expense that Sweden would otherwise have to spend if it abated
all of its required emissions by itself without trading.
Germany made a profit by abating more emissions than
required: it met the regulations by abating all of the emissions
that was required of it (RReq). Additionally, Germany
sold its surplus to Sweden as credits, and was paid 'P' for
every unit it abated, while spending less than 'P'. Its total
revenue is the area of the graph (RReq 1 2 R*), its
total abatement cost is area (RReq 3 2 R*), and so
its net benefit from selling emission credits is the area (Δ
1-2-3) i.e. Gains from Trade
The two R* (on both graphs) represent the efficient
allocations that arise from trading.
- Germany: sold (R* - RReq) emission credits to
Sweden at a unit price 'P'.
- Sweden bought emission credits from Germany at a unit
price 'P'.
If the total cost for reducing a particular amount of
emissions in the 'Command Control' scenario is called 'X', then
to reduce the same amount of combined pollution in Sweden and
Germany, the total abatement cost would be less in the
'Emissions Trading' scenario i.e. (X - Δ 123 - Δ def).
The example above applies not just at the national level: it
applies just as well between two companies in different
countries, or between two subsidiaries within the same company.
Applying the economic theory
The nature of the pollutant plays a very important role when
policy-makers decide which framework should be used to control
pollution.
CO2 acts globally, thus its impact on the
environment is generally similar wherever in the globe it is
released. So the location of the originator of the emissions
does not really matter from an environmental standpoint.
The policy framework should be different for regional
pollutants[19]
(e.g. SO2 and NOX, and also mercury)
because the impact exerted by these pollutants may not be the
same in all locations. The same amount of a regional pollutant
can exert a very high impact in some locations and a low impact
in other locations, so it does actually matter where the
pollutant is released. This is known as the 'Hot Spot' problem.
A Lagrange framework is commonly used to determine the least
cost of achieving an objective, in this case the total reduction
in emissions required in a year. In some cases it is possible to
use the Lagrange optimization framework to determine the
required reductions for each country (based on their MAC) so
that the total cost of reduction is minimized. In such a
scenario, the
Lagrange multiplier represents the market allowance price
(P) of a pollutant, such as the current market allowance price
of emissions in Europe[20]
and the USA.[21]
All countries face the market allowance price as existent in
the market that day, so they are able to make individual
decisions that would maximize their profit while at the same
time achieving regulatory compliance. This is also another
version of the
Equi-Marginal Principle, commonly used in economics to
choose the most economically efficient decision.
Prices versus quantities, and the
safety valve
There has been longstanding debate on the relative merits of
price versus quantity instruments to achieve
emission reductions.[22]
- An emission cap and permit trading system is a
quantity instrument because it fixes the overall
emission level (quantity) and allows the price to vary. One
problem with the cap and trade system is the uncertainty of
the cost of compliance as the price of a permit is not known
in advance and will vary over time according to market
conditions.
- In contrast, an
emission tax is a price instrument because it
fixes the price while the emission level is allowed to vary
according to economic activity. A major drawback of an
emission tax is that the environmental outcome (e.g. a limit
on the amount of emissions) is not guaranteed.
The best choice depends on the sensitivity of the costs of
emission reduction, compared to the sensitivity of the benefits
(i.e., climate damages avoided by a reduction) when the level of
emission control is varied.
Because there is high uncertainty in the compliance costs of
firms, some argue that the optimum choice is the price
mechanism.
However, some scientists have warned of a threshold in
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide beyond which a
run-away
warming effect could take place, with a large possibility of
causing irreversible damages. If this is a conceivable risk then
a quantity instrument could be a better choice because the
quantity of emissions may be capped with a higher degree of
certainty. However, this may not be true if this risk exists but
cannot be attached to a known level of GHG concentration or a
known emission pathway.[23]
A third option, known as a safety valve, is a hybrid
of the price and quantity instruments. The system is essentially
an emission cap and tradeable permit system but the maximum (or
minimum) permit price is capped. Emitters have the choice of
either obtaining permits in the marketplace or purchasing them
from the government at a specified trigger price (which could be
adjusted over time). The system is sometimes recommended as a
way of overcoming the fundamental disadvantages of both systems
by giving governments the flexibility to adjust the system as
new information comes to light. It can be shown that by setting
the trigger price high enough, or the number of permits low
enough, the safety valve can be used to mimic either a pure
quantity or pure price mechanism.[24]
All three methods are being used as policy instruments to
control greenhouse gas emissions: the EU-ETS is a quantity
system using the cap and trading system to meet targets set by
National Allocation Plans, the UK's
Climate Change Levy is a price system using a direct
carbon tax, while China uses the CO2 market price
for funding of its
Clean Development Mechanism projects, but imposes a
safety valve of a minimum price per tonne of CO2.
Trading systems
Kyoto Protocol
The
Kyoto Protocol is a 1997 international treaty which came
into force in 2005, which binds most developed nations to a cap
and trade system for the six major
greenhouse gases.[25]
(The United States is the only industrialized nation under
Annex I which has not ratified and therefore is not bound by
it.) Emission quotas were agreed by each participating country,
with the intention of reducing their overall emissions by 5.2%
of their 1990 levels by the end of 2012. Under the treaty, for
the 5-year compliance period from 2008 until 2012,[26]
nations that emit less than their quota will be able to sell
emissions credits to nations that exceed their quota.
It is also possible for developed countries within the
trading scheme to sponsor
carbon projects that provide a reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions in other countries, as a way of generating tradeable
carbon credits. The Protocol allows this through
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and
Joint Implementation (JI) projects, in order to provide
flexible mechanisms to aid regulated entities in meeting their
compliance with their caps. The UNFCCC validates all CDM
projects to ensure they create genuine additional savings and
that there is no
carbon leakage.
The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has projected that
the financial effect of compliance through trading within the
Kyoto commitment period will be 'limited' at between 0.1-1.1% of
GDP among trading countries.[27]
By comparison the
Stern report placed the costs of doing nothing at five to 20
times higher.[28]
Australia
Garnaut Draft Report
In 2003 the New South Wales (NSW) state government
unilaterally established the
NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme to reduce emissions by
requiring electricity generators and large consumers to purchase
NSW Greenhouse Abatement Certificates (NGACs). This has prompted
the rollout of free energy-efficient compact fluorescent
lightbulbs and other energy-efficiency measures, funded by the
credits. This scheme has been criticised by the Centre for
Energy and Environmental Markets (CEEM) of the UNSW because of
its reliance upon offsets.
[29]
On 4 June 2007, former Prime Minister
John Howard announced an
Australian Carbon Trading Scheme to be introduced by 2012,
but opposition parties called the plan "too little, too late."[30]
On 24 November 2007 Howard's coalition government lost a general
election and was succeeded by the Labor Party, with
Kevin Rudd taking over as prime minister. Prime Minister
Rudd announced that a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme
would be introduced in 2010[31]
, however this scheme was delayed by a year until mid-2011.[32]
Australia's Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments
commissioned the
Garnaut Climate Change Review, a study by Professor
Ross Garnaut on the mechanism of a potential emissions
trading scheme. Its interim report was released on 21 February
2008.[33]
It recommended an emissions trading scheme that includes
transportation but not agriculture, and that emissions permits
should be sold competitively and not allocated free to carbon
polluters. It recognised that energy prices will increase and
that low income families will need to be compensated. It
recommended more support for research into low emissions
technologies and a new body to oversee such research. It also
recognised the need for transition assistance for coal mining
areas.
[34]
In response to Garnaut's draft report, the
Rudd
Labor government issued a Green Paper[35]
on 16 July that described the intended design of the actual
trading scheme. Draft legislation will be released in December
2008, to become law in 2009.[36]
European Union
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (or EU ETS) is the
largest multi-national, greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme
in the world and was created in conjunction with the
Kyoto Protocol.
After voluntary
trials in the UK and Denmark, Phase I commenced operation in
January 2005 with all 15 (now 25 of the 27) member states of the
European Union participating.[37]
The program caps the amount of carbon dioxide that can be
emitted from large installations, such as power plants and
carbon intensive factories and covers almost half of the EU's
Carbon Dioxide emissions.[38]
Phase I permits participants to trade amongst themselves and in
validated credits from the developing world through Kyoto's
Clean Development Mechanism.
Whilst the first phase (2005 - 2007) has received much
criticism due to oversupply of allowances and the distribution
method of allowances (via grandfathering rather than
auctioning), Phase II links the ETS to other countries
participating in the Kyoto trading system. The European
Commission has been tough on Member States' Plans for Phase II,
dismissing many of them as being too loose again.[39]
In addition, the first phase has established a strong carbon
market. Compliance was high in 2006, increasing confidence in
the scheme, although the value of allowances dropped when the
national caps were met.
All EU member states have ratified the
Kyoto Protocol, and so the second phase of the EU ETS has
been designed to support the Kyoto mechanisms and compliance
period. Thus any organisation trading through the ETS should
also meet the international trading obligations under Kyoto.
New Zealand
The
New Zealand Government introduced a
bill for emissions trading schemes before a
select committee. Various reports by a range of groups
support the scheme but differ in opinion as to how it should be
implemented.[40]
An interesting feature of the
New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme is that it includes
forest carbon and creates deforestation liabilities for
landowners.[41]
The emissions trading bill passed into law on 10 September
2008. On November 16 2008 the newly formed National-led
government announced that it would delay implementation of the
ETS pending a full review of climate change policy.
United States
An early example of an emission trading system has been the
SO2 trading system under the framework of the
Acid Rain Program of the 1990
Clean Air Act in the U.S. Under the program, which is
essentially a cap-and-trade emissions trading system, SO2
emissions were reduced by 50 percent from 1980 levels by 2007.[42]
Some experts argue that the "cap and trade" system of SO2
emissions reduction has reduced the cost of controlling acid
rain by as much as 80 percent versus source-by-source reduction.[43][44]
In 1997, the State of
Illinois adopted a trading program for
volatile organic compounds in most of the Chicago area,
called the Emissions Reduction Market System.[45]
Beginning in 2000, over 100 major sources of pollution in eight
Illinois counties began trading pollution credits.
In 2003,
New York State proposed and attained commitments from nine
Northeast states to form a cap and trade
carbon dioxide emissions program for power generators,
called the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This program
launched on January 1, 2009 with the aim to reduce the carbon
"budget" of each state's electricity generation sector to 10
percent below their 2009 allowances by 2018.[46]
Also in 2003, U.S. corporations were able to trade CO2
emission allowances on the
Chicago Climate Exchange under a voluntary scheme. In August
2007, the Exchange announced a mechanism to create emission
offsets for projects within the United States that cleanly
destroy
ozone-depleting
substances.[47]
In 2007, the
California Legislature passed the California Global Warming
Solutions Act,
AB-32, which was signed into law by Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger. Thus far, flexible mechanisms in the
form of project based offsets have been suggested for five main
project types. A
carbon project would create offsets by showing that it has
reduced carbon dioxide and equivalent gases. The project types
include: manure management, forestry, building energy, SF6, and
landfill gas capture.
Since February 2007, seven U.S. states and four Canadian
provinces have joined together to create the
Western Climate Initiative, a regional greenhouse gas
emissions trading system.[48]
On November 17, 2008 President-elect
Barack Obama clarified, in a talk recorded for
YouTube, that the US will enter a cap and trade system to
limit
global warming.[49]
The
2010 United States federal budget proposes to support clean
energy development with a 10-year investment of US $15 billion
per year, generated from the sale of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions credits. Under the proposed cap-and-trade program, all
GHG emissions credits would be auctioned off, generating an
estimated $78.7 billion in additional revenue in FY 2012,
steadily increasing to $83 billion by FY 2019.[50]
American Clean Energy and Security Act, a cap and trade bill
was passed on June 26, 2009 in the House of Representatives.
Renewable energy certificates
Renewable Energy Certificates, or "green tags", are
transferable rights for renewable energy within some American
states. A
renewable energy provider gets issued one green tag for each
1,000
KWh of energy it produces. The energy is sold into the
electrical grid, and the certificates can be sold on the open
market for additional profit. They are purchased by firms or
individuals in order to identify a portion of their energy with
renewable sources and are voluntary.
They are typically used like an
offsetting scheme or to show
corporate responsibility, although their issuance is
unregulated, with no national registry to ensure there is no
double-counting. However, it is one way that an organization
could purchase its energy from a local provider who uses fossil
fuels, but back it with a certificate that supports a specific
wind or hydro power project.
The carbon market
- This section deals with mandatory carbon emissions
trading between nations. For voluntary carbon trading
schemes for individuals, see
Personal carbon trading and
Carbon offset
Carbon emissions trading is emissions trading specifically
for
carbon dioxide (calculated in tonnes of
carbon dioxide equivalent or tCO2e) and currently
makes up the bulk of emissions trading. It is one of the ways
countries can meet their obligations under the
Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbon emissions and thereby
mitigate global warming.
Market trend
Carbon emissions trading has been steadily increasing in
recent years. According to the
World Bank's Carbon Finance Unit, 374 million metric tonnes
of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) were exchanged
through projects in 2005, a 240% increase relative to 2004 (110
mtCO2e)[51]
which was itself a 41% increase relative to 2003 (78 mtCO2e).[52]
In terms of dollars, the World Bank has estimated that the
size of the carbon market was 11 billion USD in 2005, 30 billion
USD in 2006,[51]
and 64 billion in 2007.[53]
The Marrakesh Accords of the Kyoto protocol defined the
international trading mechanisms and registries needed to
support trading between countries, with allowance trading now
occurring between European countries and Asian countries.
However, while the USA as a nation did not ratify the Protocol,
many of its states are now developing cap-and-trade systems and
are looking at ways to link their emissions trading systems
together, nationally and internationally, to seek out the lowest
costs and improve liquidity of the market.[54]
However, these states also wish to preserve their individual
integrity and unique features. For example, in contrast to the
other Kyoto-compliant systems, some states propose other types
of greenhouse gas sources, different measurement methods,
setting a maximum on the price of allowances, or restricting
access to CDM projects. Creating instruments that are not truly
fungible would introduce instability and make pricing
difficult. Various proposals are being investigated to see how
these systems might be linked across markets, with the
International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) as an
international body to help co-ordinate this.[55][56]
Business reaction
With the creation of a
market for mandatory trading of carbon dioxide emissions
within the Kyoto Protocol, the
London financial marketplace has established itself as the
center of the carbon finance market, and is expected to have
grown into a market valued at $60 billion in 2007.[57]
The voluntary offset market, by comparison, is projected to grow
to about $4bn by 2010.[58]
23
multinational corporations came together in the
G8 Climate Change Roundtable, a business group formed at the
January 2005
World Economic Forum. The group included
Ford,
Toyota,
British Airways,
BP and
Unilever. On June 9, 2005 the Group published a statement
stating that there was a need to act on climate change and
stressing the importance of market-based solutions. It called on
governments to establish "clear, transparent, and consistent
price signals" through "creation of a long-term policy
framework" that would include all major producers of greenhouse
gases.[59]
By December 2007 this had grown to encompass 150 global
businesses.[60]
Business in the UK have come out strongly in support of
emissions trading as a key tool to mitigate climate change,
supported by NGOs.[61]
However, not all businesses favor a trading approach. On
December 11, 2008,
Rex Tillerson, the CEO of
Exxonmobil, said a
carbon tax is "a more direct, more transparent and more
effective approach" than a cap and trade program, which he said,
"inevitably introduces unnecessary cost and complexity." He also
said that he hoped that the revenues from a carbon tax would be
used to lower other taxes so as to be revenue neutral.
[62]
The
International Air Transport Association, whose 230 member
airlines comprise 93% of all international traffic, position is
that trading should be based on “benchmarking,” setting
emissions levels based on industry averages, rather than
“grandfathering,” which would use individual companies’ previous
emissions levels to set their future permit allowances. They
argue grandfathering “would penalise airlines that took early
action to modernise their fleets, while a benchmarking approach,
if designed properly, would reward more efficient operations."
[63]
Measuring, reporting, verification
(MRV) and enforcement
Meaningful emission reductions within a trading system can
only occur if they can be measured at the level of operator or
installation and reported to a regulator. For greenhouse gases
all trading countries maintain an inventory of emissions at
national and installation level; in addition, the trading groups
within North America maintain inventories at the state level
through
The Climate Registry. For trading between regions these
inventories must be consistent, with equivalent units and
measurement techniques.
In some industrial processes emissions can be physically
measured by inserting sensors and flowmeters in chimneys and
stacks, but many types of activity rely on theoretical
calculations for measurement. Depending on local legislation,
these measurements may require additional checks and
verification by government or third party
auditors, prior or post submission to the local regulator.
Another critical part is
enforcement.[64]
Without effective MRV and enforcement the value of allowances
are diminished. Enforcement can be done using several means,
including
fines or
sanctioning those that have exceeded their allowances.
Concerns include the cost of MRV and enforcement and the risk
that facilities may be tempted to mislead rather than make real
reductions or make up their shortfall by purchasing allowances
or offsets from another entity. The net effect of a corrupt
reporting system or poorly managed or financed regulator may be
a discount on emission costs, and a (hidden) increase in actual
emissions.
Criticism
There are critics of the methods, mainly environmental
justice nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and movements, who
see carbon trading as a proliferation of the free market into
public spaces and environmental policy-making.[65]
They level accusations of failures in accounting, dubious
science and the destructive impacts of projects upon local
peoples and environments as reasons why trading pollution
allowances should be avoided.[66]
In its place they advocate making reductions at the source of
pollution and energy policies that are justice-based and
community-driven.[67]
Most of the criticisms have been focused on the carbon market
created through investment in Kyoto Mechanisms. Criticism of
'cap and trade' emissions trading has generally been more
limited to lack of credibility in the first phase of the EU ETS.
Critics argue that emissions trading does little to solve
pollution problems overall, as groups that do not pollute sell
their conservation to the highest bidder. Overall reductions
would need to come from a sufficient and challenging reduction
of allowances available in the system.
Regulatory agencies run the risk of issuing too many emission
credits, diluting the effectiveness of regulation, and
practically removing the cap. In this case, instead of any net
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, beneficiaries of
emissions trading simply do more of the polluting activity. The
National Allocation Plans by member governments of the European
Union Emission Trading Scheme were criticised for this when it
became apparent that actual emissions would be less than the
government-issued carbon allowances at the end of Phase I of the
scheme.
They have also been criticised for the practice of
grandfathering, where polluters are given free allowances by
governments, instead of being made to pay for them.[68]
Critics instead advocate for auctioning the credits. The
proceeds could be used for research and development of
sustainable technology.[69]
Critics of carbon trading, such as
Carbon Trade Watch, argue that it places disproportionate
emphasis on individual lifestyles and carbon footprints,
distracting attention from the wider, systemic changes and
collective political action that needs to be taken to tackle
climate change.[65]
Groups such as
the Corner House have argued that the market will choose the
easiest means to save a given quantity of carbon in the short
term, which may be different to the pathway required to obtain
sustained and sizable reductions over a longer period, and so a
market led approach is likely to reinforce technological
lock-in. For instance small cuts may often be achieved cheaply
through investment in making a technology more efficient, where
larger cuts would require scrapping the technology and using a
different one. They also argue that emissions trading is
undermining alternative approaches to pollution control with
which it does not combine well, and so the overall effect it is
having is to actually stall significant change to less polluting
technologies.
The problem of unstable prices can be resolved, to some
degree, by the creation of forward markets in caps.
Nevertheless, it is easier to make a tax predictable than the
price of a cap. However, the corresponding uncertainty under a
tax is the level of emissions reductions achieved.
The
Financial Times published an article on cap and trade
systems which argued that "Carbon markets create a muddle" and
"...leave much room for unverifiable manipulation".[70]
More recent criticism of emissions trading regarding
implementation is that old growth forests, which have slow
carbon absorption rates, are being cleared and replaced with
fast-growing vegetation, to the detriment of the local
communities.[71]
Recent proposals for alternative schemes that seek to avoid
the problems of Cap and Trade schemes include
Cap and Share, which was being actively considered by the
Irish Parliament in May 2008, and the Sky Trust schemes.
See also
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Cap and Trade 101,
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Sullivan, Arthur, and Steven M. Sheffrin. Economics:
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External links
General trading
Carbon trading